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Netjes, Catherine E., and Erica Edwards, 2005: 
Taking Europe to Its Extremes. Examining Cueing Effects of Right-Wing Populist Parties 
on Public Opinion Regarding European Integration.  
Discussion Paper SP IV 2005-202. 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). 
Abstract 
In this article we examine the role of right-wing parties in framing and mobilizing national 
identity against European integration. Using a multi-level analysis and combining 
individual-level and contextual data, we analyze public support for European integration 
within the Western European member states of the European Union from 1992 to 2002. 
The empirical analysis shows that national identities are contested and constructed within 
national contexts and that right-wing populist elites act as influential political cues in this 
process. Populist political entrepreneurs on the right side of the political spectrum play a 
decisive role in framing opposition to supranational governance with defense of the 
national community.  
Kurzzusammenfassung 
In diesem Papier untersuchen wir die Rolle rechter Parteien bei der Gestaltung nationaler 
Identität und ihrer Mobilisierung gegen die europäische Integration. Mit Hilfe einer 
Mehrebenenanalyse und der Kombination von Daten auf der individuellen und der 
kontextuellen Ebene, analysieren wir die öffentliche Unterstützung für die europäische 
Integration in den westeuropäischen Mitgliedsstaaten der Europäischen Union von 1992 
bis 2002. Die empirische Untersuchung zeigt, dass nationale Identitäten im nationalen 
Kontext ausgefochten und herausgebildet werden und dass rechte populistische Eliten in 
diesem Prozess als einflussreiche politische Signalgeber fungieren. Populistische politische 
Entrepreneurs auf der rechten Seite des politischen Spektrums spielen eine entscheidende 
Rolle bei der Herausbildung einer Opposition zur supranationalen Regierung im Namen 
der Verteidigung der nationalen Gemeinschaft. 
 

 Catherine E. Netjes and Erica Edwards 
Taking Europe to Its Extremes 
Examining Cueing Effects of Right-Wing Populist Parties on Public 
Opinion Regarding European Integration 
With the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU), the introduction of a single 
currency, the vast expansion of policy areas to the jurisdiction in Brussels, and the 
enlargement of the European Union (EU), the speed of the European project has gained 
full momentum. However, as the EU encroaches more and more on the everyday lives of 
its citizens, the integration process itself has become highly contested (Steenbergen and 
Marks 2004: 1). Public support for European integration has been in decline since 1992 
(Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Eichenberg and Dalton 2003). The referenda outcomes 
in Denmark, Ireland, and more recently Sweden, the low turnout in the elections to the 
European Parliament, as well as mounting levels of support for EU-skeptical parties in 
several national elections show the contemporary shift away from support for European 
integration.  
How can we explain this recent rise in Euroskepticism? Variation in public opinion 
regarding the European integration process has been studied extensively using a variety of 
explanatory concepts and a range of statistical techniques. Four dominant perspectives 
have evolved: the utilitarian, the domestic politics, the partisan cueing, and national iden-
tity approaches. This article takes off from the latter viewpoint and develops the national 
identity approach further by amending three central deficiencies underlying the work thus 
far. First, none of the studies within the national identity perspective employs a longitudi-
nal and dynamic approach to EU support. Second, studies within the national identity 
framework fail to account for the politicization of these identity considerations by political 
elites in the context of further European integration. Finally, the empirical examination of 
the national identity perspective fails to account for the multilevel or hierarchical structure 
of EU support data.1 Steenbergen and Jones (2002: 233-235) have demonstrated the severe 
implications of ignoring multilevel data structure when examining EU support.  
These deficits in the work on national identity and EU support are especially worrisome, 
as public opinion attitudes should be understood as dynamic rather than static. From this 
viewpoint—most strongly proposed in the work of Zaller (1992)—attitudes are not fixed 
                                                 
1   The one exception may be the study by Hooghe and Marks (forthcoming), which account for causal 
heterogeneity by using a multilevel analysis.  
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but rather dynamic, and respondents may exhibit conflicting attitudes simultaneously. 
Hence, expressed attitudes will differ across time and circumstance (Zaller 1992; Feldman 
and Zaller 1992). In this context, cueing effects of political elites become increasingly im-
portant. While framing effects may seem “[…] anomalies from the fixed position frame-
work, [they] are logically necessary for the [dynamic] Zaller conception; they explain, 
when many considerations are possible, which are actually drawn” (Stimson 1995: 183).  
In this article, we set out to amend the shortfalls within the national identity perspective 
on public opinion towards European integration by employing a longitudinal, multilevel, 
and framing perspective. The analysis explores public opinion towards European integra-
tion within fifteen Western European member states of the EU from 1992 to 2002.2 More-
over, we account for the hierarchical structure of the data by using a multi-level analysis 
that combines individual-level Eurobarometer data with contextual data. Finally, we 
inspect the conditions under which national identity considerations may lead to a rise in 
Euroskepticism and specifically focus on the role of populist right-wing parties in cueing 
national identity against European integration.  
This article is structured as follows: First, we describe the development of EU support in 
the decade under investigation. In the second step, we provide an overview of the different 
theories explaining EU support. Third, we theorize with regard to the cueing effects of 
political elites on public opinion and focus specifically on the mediating role of right-wing 
populist parties. In the fourth section, we present our hypotheses and the operationalization 
of our main theoretical constructs. Fifth, we present the empirical analysis of the role of 
right-wing populist parties in framing national identity against support for European inte-
gration. Finally, we conclude by discussing the implications of our findings. 
Theories Explaining Public Support for European Integration 
Since the establishment of the Single European Act (SEA) and the Treaties of Maastricht 
and Amsterdam, the EU “[…] has been transformed into a multilevel polity in which 
European issues have become important not only for national governments, but also for 
citizens, political parties, interest groups, and social movements” (Steenbergen and Marks 
2004: 1). With this qualitative and quantitative shift in the nature of the EU, the integration 
process itself has become contested. As European integration moves from a dominantly 
economic to a more political process, citizens may fear that the essence of territorial iden-
tity is threatened by the further politicization of integration in Europe. These uncertainties 
                                                 
2   Luxembourg is not included in the analysis. 
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about the nature and possible consequences of European integration are reflected in citi-
zens’ attitudes towards the integration process. Recently, most EU member states have 
witnessed a sizable drop in public support for European integration.  
Table 1 displays the change of support for European integration in the fifteen EU 
member states between 1992 and 2002.3 The table below shows that change in support for 
European integration is not equally distributed among these fifteen member states. The 
largest drops in EU support are found in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France, 
where EU support decreased by more than 10 percent. This finding is surprising as two of 
these countries were among the six founding members of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) established in 1951. Indeed with the exception of Luxembourg, all of 
the founding members (i.e., France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands) have 
witnessed a drop in support for European integration. While EU support has declined on 
average by 7.7 percent throughout the EU-15, five countries—Austria, Luxembourg, Finland, 
Ireland, and Spain—experienced a rise in support since 1992. Interestingly, two out of 
these five countries (Finland and Austria) joined the EU in the decade under investigation 
and hence may still be in the so-called “honeymoon-period.”  
An extensive literature has evolved to explain public support for European integration. 
Though more than one hundred articles have been written on this specific topic, no schol-
arly consensus has yet to be reached. Theories explaining public support for European 
integration can generally be grouped into explanations based on utilitarian self-interest or 
macro-economic performance, domestic politics, partisan cues, and national identity. The 
utilitarian theory relies on self-interested or macro explanations of political attitudes and 
suggests that citizens are more likely to support integration if it results in a net benefit to 
the national economy or to their own pocketbook (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel 
1998a; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Anderson and Reichert 1995).  
According to the domestic politics argument, citizens are generally uninformed about 
European integration and therefore lack the sophistication to act in their self-interest 
(Anderson 1998). Rather than self-interest, citizens may rely on assessments about their 
own political system, political parties, and government when forming opinions about inte-
gration, i.e., support for European integration is nested in domestic politics. From this per-
spective, support for the EU can be interpreted as a referendum on the national political 
system, the incumbent government, or established national political parties.  
 
                                                 
3   Support for European integration is measured through the following Eurobarometer question: “Generally 
speaking do you think (your country’s) membership in the Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither 
good or bad?” The values reported are the relative percentages of respondents replying that their coun-
try’s membership in the EU is a “good thing.” 
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Table 1: Country Differences in Change in Support of European Integration, 1992-2002 
 Level of Support of 
European Integration 
1992 
Level of Support of 
European Integration 
2002 
∆ in Support of European 
Integration 
1992-2002 
EU-15 average 67.4 59.7 -7.7 
United Kingdom 51.0 38.0 -13.0 
Netherlands 86.6 75.9 -10.7 
France  59.3 49.1 -10.2 
Greece 76.5 66.5 -10.0 
Germany 63.5 56.1 -7.4 
Portugal 71.1 66.2 -4.9 
Italy 76.9 73.1 -3.8 
Belgium 66.3 62.6 -3.7 
Denmark 64.5 61.5 -3.0 
Sweden* 41.0 39.3 -1.7 
Austria* 37.5 39.7 +2.2 
Luxembourg 79.1 83.1 +4.0 
Finland* 35.4 41.2 +5.8 
Ireland 76.4 82.9 +6.5 
Spain 63.5 70.5 +7.0 
*  The changes in support for European integration summarized in this table display the changes in the sev-
eral member states between 1992 and 2002, except for three countries, in which the changes documented 
correspond to different time-periods: Finland, 1993-2002, and Sweden and Austria, 1994 and 2002. 
 
Following a similar logic, a number of scholars have suggested that opinions about Euro-
pean integration are largely driven by elites (Janssen 1991; Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren 
1994; Wessels 1995; Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Ray 2003). Research has shown that the 
human capacity for calculation is far more limited than utilitarian models presume (Chong 
2000; Kinder 1998). Cues presented by political elites provide citizens with cognitive 
short-cuts that help them decide what is in their interest. In the case of support for Euro-
pean integration, studies focus on the effects of partisan cueing, hypothesizing that parties’ 
stances on European integration are used by party supporters to inform their own position. 
Empirical studies have indeed found evidence that party supporters adapt their opinions to 
those of their party (Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren 1994; Steenbergen and Jones 2002; 
Ray 2003).  
The final explanation of EU support highlights national identity as a decisive force 
shaping support for European integration (Carey and Lebo 2000; Carey 2002; McLaren 
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2002; Hooghe and Marks forthcoming). Carey and Lebo (2000) show that declining levels 
of support can be explained by an increase in feelings of national identity. The authors 
argue that “[t]his increase in nationalism is negatively related to support for the European 
project because of the conflicts over sovereignty that developed in this era, such as the 
creation of a single European currency, the European Central Bank, and the increased pri-
macy of European law” (Carey and Lebo 2000: 3). McLaren also shows that “[a]ntipathy 
toward the EU is not just about cost/benefit calculations […] but about fear of, or hostility 
toward, other cultures” (2002: 533).  
Of the theories elaborated above, explanations focusing on utilitarian self-interest or 
macroeconomic performance dominate the literature. This cost/benefit approach hypothe-
sizes that as the material gains of a country increase, through market and trade liberaliza-
tion throughout the EU, citizens’ support for European integration increases. This hypothe-
sis has been tested at the micro- as well as macro-levels. At the micro-level, Gabel (1998b) 
shows that those who directly benefit from these economic gains, for example the highly 
educated or farmers, exhibit higher levels of support. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) have 
demonstrated the relevance of national macroeconomic performance on approval to Euro-
pean integration and found macroeconomic variables, such as GDP, to be positively related 
to support for the EU. However, a more recent study by Eichenberg and Dalton (2003: 19) 
shows that macroeconomic performance no longer explains EU support after the 
Maastricht Treaty. The relationship between support and annual percentage change in GDP 
or inflation is no longer significant. The authors conclude that “[t]he contrast in the pre- 
and post-Maastricht periods indicates that as citizens became aware of the implications of 
the EMU and the EU’s changing policy role, their calculus for support changed” (Eichenberg 
and Dalton 2003: 19).  
This article builds on the expectation put forward by Eichenberg and Dalton (2003: 19) 
regarding a possible change in the nature of support among EU citizens. We argue that 
following the shift in the process of European integration from a mostly economic to a 
more political project, the criteria for evaluating the EU include economic as well as sym-
bolic political considerations (see also Carey 2002: 390). These symbolic considerations 
refer to feelings of national identity. The national identity perspective draws on the psy-
chology of group membership to consider how national identity influences support for 
European integration. The core contribution of the national identity approach to the EU 
opinion literature is demonstrating that group loyalty affects support for European integra-
tion and that a citizen is not merely a homo economicus. “Humans evolved an emotional 
capacity for group loyalty long before the development of rational faculties. These loyal-
ties can be extremely powerful in shaping views towards political objects” (Hooghe and 
Marks forthcoming: 5). 
6 
The research thus far has found conflicting results regarding the influence of national 
identity on support for European integration. Whereas some studies argue that regional or 
national identities are consistent with European identity and support for European integra-
tion (Marks 1999; Haesly 2001), others have shown that national attachment combined 
with national pride have a significant negative effect on EU support (Carey 2002). In this 
article, we shed light on the impact of national identity on support for European integration 
by examining the relationship across time and space. In order to examine this relationship 
empirically, it is important to understand the concept of national identity and its possible 
effect on support for European integration.  
We understand national identity as “[…] a sense of community” that “[…] consists of 
the feeling of belonging together as a group which, because it shares a political structure, 
also shares a political fate” (Easton 1965: 185). National identity thus refers to a sense of 
collective community which distinguishes a particular community from another. National 
identity implies a feeling of us against others. Moreover, the definition of national identity 
posed here points to the fact that national identity must be understood in relation to the 
political structure. This idea is of great relevance in the context of the EU, as it raises the 
question if the EU as a polity can form an object of identification. European integration can 
be seen as a process of multilevel governance, in which supranational, national, and sub-
national political institutions and elites share control over policy making (Hooghe and 
Marks 2001: 1-10). From a multilevel governance perspective, the EU can be considered 
as a polity or regime that “overarches” national communities and as such can be the object 
of identification. While some people may identify solely with one level of governance, i.e., 
their nation-state, others may feel they owe allegiance to several levels of governance, their 
nation-state as well as the EU for example.  
Against this backdrop, we need to distinguish between two types of national identity. As 
Hooghe and Marks (forthcoming) note, it is important to judge the extent to which national 
identity is exclusive or inclusive. Individuals with an inclusive national identity have mul-
tiple identities, which may include regional, national, and European identities. Individuals 
who conceive of their national identity as exclusive, however, identify only with the 
national level of governance and may therefore consider multilevel governance a threat. 
Thus, exclusive national identity can be expected to form an obstacle to support for Euro-
pean integration, as individuals adhering to exclusive national identity view the nation-
state as the level of political organization to which they owe allegiance. 
It is important to point out that although national identities are shaped through socializa-
tion, they are contested within national contexts. In this respect, research on the origins of 
national identity highlights the socialization aspect of identity and the importance of 
myths, symbols, and traditions in the development of “imagined communities” (Anderson 
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1992: 5-6). However, national identity is also seen to be subject to reinvention or reinte-
pretation over time (Smith 1991). This idea implies that feelings of national identity are not 
necessarily stable, but may vary over time, as they are subject to processes of societal con-
flict and political contestation. Figure 1 shows the variation in national identity across time 
within the EU-15. National identity is measured using the following Eurobarometer ques-
tion: “In the near future, do you see yourself as (1) [nationality] only, (2) [nationality] and 
European, (3) European and [nationality], or (4) European only?” The values in the fig-
ure represent the percentage of respondents that see themselves as being of their respective 
nationality only and do not identify themselves as European. 
 
Figure 1: Feelings of National Identity across Time, 1992-2002 
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The figure above demonstrates that feelings of national identity indeed fluctuate over time, 
varying between 30 and 50 percent on average within the EU-15 in the time-period from 
1992 to 2002. The figure also shows national identity levels in the United Kingdom and 
Luxembourg. In the latter country, feelings of national identity are significantly lower than 
the EU average (0.5 standard deviations below the EU-15 mean), fluctuating mainly 
between the 20 and 30 percent. In contrast, feelings of national identity among British citi-
zens are almost one standard deviation above the average mean level within the EU-15. 
Here, the percentages vary between 50 and 70 percent. In all, the figure supports the idea 
of possible reinterpretations of national identities over time within national contexts. In the 
next section, we consider to the cueing effects of right-wing populist parties in this respect. 
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Conceptualizing the Cueing Effects of Right-Wing Populist Parties 
The idea that public opinion is fundamentally top-down and elite-driven is virtually an 
orthodoxy among political scientists. In the words of V. O. Key, “[t]he voice of the people 
is but an echo” (1966: 2). Research has shown that citizens are often ill-informed and 
exhibit low levels of political knowledge about foreign policy and international politics, 
including EU matters (Bennet 1996; Holsti 1992; Janssen 1991). Hence, political elites 
provide citizens with cognitive short-cuts that help them decide what is in their interest 
(Zaller 1992; Page and Shapiro 1992). By taking a stance on a particular issue, elites 
attempt to persuade citizens to adopt like-minded positions (Popkin 1991; Zaller 1992; 
Lupia and McCubbins 1998). The support cited above stems from the study American 
public opinion; however, we also find evidence for a top-down perspective in the context 
of Europe. There is an expansive body of scholarship within the EU support literature sug-
gesting that political elites shape public attitudes toward European integration (Franklin, 
Marsh, and McLaren 1994; Wessels 1995; Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Ray 2003). 
Looking to the research on public opinion and mass behavior, we find strong support for 
elite cueing on integration issues. Wessels, for example, analyzes the direction of influence 
between the parties and their electorates and finds that “parties are able to mobilize their 
supporters, bringing them closer to the party, whether for or against the EC” (1995: 161). 
In his test of various theories of support for integration, Gabel (1998a) demonstrates that 
class partisanship and incumbent support are important influences on electorate opinions.  
Research on referenda campaigns has also produced support for a top-down connection. 
Work by Franklin and his colleagues on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty demon-
strates that voting behavior in the referenda was linked to support for incumbency parties 
(Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren 1994; Franklin, Marsh, and Wlezien 1994; Franklin, van 
der Eijk, and Marsh 1995). Similarly, more recent work by Hug and Sciarini (2000) on all 
EU referenda shows that support for incumbency parties is an important influence on EU 
support. Against this backdrop, we adopt a top-down perspective on public opinion on 
European integration.4 This perspective is especially relevant in the context of EU support 
since citizens show low levels of political interest and knowledge on EU matters, espe-
cially when compared to the national context (Niedermayer and Sinnott 1995). Hence, it 
seems reasonable to expect EU citizens to be responsive to cueing by political party elites 
when forming their opinions about European integration.  
                                                 
4   Note that authors have criticized this top-down approach and demonstrated a bottom-up connection 
between public and party preferences regarding the EU (see Carrubba 2001). Although we are aware of 
the debate with regard to the top-down or bottom-up nature of public opinion concerning the EU, in this 
article we nonetheless adopt an elite driven model on the basis of the extensive evidence from work on 
European and American public opinion. 
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Whereas the studies on elite cueing effects on EU public opinion thus far focus on the 
correspondence between parties’ opinions regarding the EU and the opinions their respec-
tive party supporters, our aim here is slightly different. We do not restrict the cueing effect 
of right-wing populist parties only to party supporters as most of the elite cueing models 
propose. Rather, we argue that right-wing populist parties frame the European integration 
process in nationalist terms and hence mobilize feelings of national identity against the EU 
regardless of whether citizens would support these parties in a specific election. Recall that 
figure 1 demonstrated that feelings of national identity fluctuated extensively from 1992 to 
2002. Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that a significant number of citizens may be 
affected by the mobilization of right-wing populist parties. Table 2 presents an overview of 
the parties included in the analysis. The table shows that nine out of the fifteen Western 
European EU member states had a Euroskeptical right-wing populist party in the time-span 
of this analysis.5 The vote share of right-wing populist parties in Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden between 1992 and 2002 never 
surpassed 20 percent of the eligible voting population. 
Every party included in the table above opposes European integration. These parties all 
received at least 1.5 percentage of the vote in parliamentary elections held in the EU-15 
between 1992 and 2002 or obtained at least one seat in parliament during this same period. 
We expect these right-wing populist parties to tap into feelings of nationalism to reject 
further integration and to defend the nation against control from Brussels. Hooghe, Marks, 
and Wilson (2002) point out that such parties have formed the largest reservoir of 
Euroskepticism across the EU since 1996.  
A prime example of a party mobilizing national identity agianst European integration is 
the Danish People’s Party. This party views the EU mainly as a threat to Danish identity, 
values, and sovereignty. For example, they voiced their opposition to the Amsterdam 
Treaty in the 1998 campaign with the slogan “vote Danish, vote no.”6 Their party program 
for the 2001 general election was entitled “Denmark for the Danes” and portrayed a clear 
anti-immigration and anti-EU sentiment.7 Similarly, in the wake of the upcoming referen-
                                                 
5   The term right-wing populist parties may be misleading in some respects, as the populist parties pre-
sented in table 2 may be right-wing on some policy areas but may also include left-wing issue positions 
in their party programs. A good example of such a party is the Danish People’s Party. Whereas the party 
clearly has anti-immigration and xenophobic programmatic elements, it is also highly supportive of wel-
fare state provisions in Denmark, i.e., incorporates left-wing issue positions. However, in this analysis 
we focus on the mobilizing of exclusive national identity of these parties against European integration, 
so the anti-immigration, xenophobic, and anti- or EU-skeptical character of these parties is of main rele-
vance to us. Therefore, we characterize these parties as right-wing populist parties. Notwithstanding, we 
realize that the programmatics of the parties summed up in table 2 cover an array of different policy 
positions.  
6   See article Past ‘No’ haunts EU referendum in the Copenhagen Post under www.cphpost.dk/get/ 
55301.htm. 
7   http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk 
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dum on the Constitutional Treaty on June 1, 2005, Dutch political entrepreneurs in the no-
camp are attempting to utilize fears with regard to the possible accession of Turkey to the EU.8  
 
Table 2: Right-Wing Populist Parties in the EU, 1992-2002 
 Right-Wing Populist Party 
Austria Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs Freedom Party of Austria 
Belgium Vlaams Blok Flemish Block 
 Front National National Front 
Denmark Fremskridtspartiet Progress Party 
 Dansk Folkepartis Danish Peoples’ Party 
France Front National National Front 
 Mouvement pour la France Movement for France 
 Mouvement national républicain National Republican Movement 
Germany Die Republikaner Republican Party 
 Deutsche Volksunion German Peoples’ Union 
Italy Allianza Nationale National Alliance 
 Movimento Sociale Italiano – Destra Nazionale Italian Social Movement  
Netherlands Centrum Democraten Center Democrats 
 Lijst Pim Fortuyn List Pim Fortuyn 
Sweden Ny Demokrati New Democracy 
British National Party  United Kingdom 
United Kingdom Independence Party  
Note: All parties included here 1) received at least 1.5 percent of the vote in a parliamentary election between 
1992 and 2002 or 2) obtained at least one parliamentary seat between 1992 and 2002.  
 
In all, we argue that national identities are constructed within national contexts and that the 
cueing of political elites is influential in this process. We expect right-wing populist parties 
to take on a key role in mobilizing national identity, as these parties frame opposition to 
supranational governance with defense of the national community (Hooghe and Marks 
forthcoming). Hence, these parties provide citizens with negative cues regarding European 
integration. The explanation of public support for European integration presented in this 
article combines elements of the elite-cueing and national identity perspectives on EU 
support. Moreover, we also control for the utlitarian approach in the empirical analysis. 
                                                 
8   See the website of the Groep Geert Wilders under www.geertwilders.nl for a prime example of this 
strategy. 
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Hypotheses and Operationalization 
In order to examine the role of right-wing populist parties in framing national identity 
against the EU, we analyze public support for European integration within the fourteen 
Western European member states using a multilevel analysis, which allows us to combine 
both individual-level as well as contextual data. In this section, we define the key theoreti-
cal factors influencing EU support, focusing on the following two main hypotheses: 
H1: Exclusive national identity is negatively related to support for European integration. 
H2: There is an interaction effect between national identity and the presence of a right-
wing populist party, which is in turn negatively related to support for European 
integration. 
The post-Maastricht transition to the EMU and particularly its convergence criteria has 
brought the EU further into the political realm. Against this backdrop, we expect that 
national identity has become an important element in explaining EU support. As the nature 
of European integration has changed over time, supranational governance may increasingly 
be perceived as a threat to national traditions. We therefore expect exclusive national iden-
tity (Exclusive National Identity) to be negatively related to EU support (see H1). More-
over, national identities can be expected to become contested and constructed within 
national contexts; accordingly, we hypothesize an interaction effect between exclusive 
national identity and the presence of a right-wing populist party (RWPP * Exclusive 
National Identity).9 Our expectation is that this interaction effect is negatively related to 
support for European integration (see H2). Right-wing populist parties are expected to play 
a decisive role in mobilizing exclusive national identity against European integration. 
These parties tap nationalism to reject further control from Brussels and thus provide citi-
zens with negative cues regarding European integration.  
As highlighted earlier, the dominant perspective on support for European integration 
focuses on utilitarian self-interest or macro-economic performance. Acknowledging the 
centrality of this perspective and in light of Eichenberg and Dalton’s (2003) recent study 
suggesting that macroeconomic importance may have a waning impact on EU support in a 
post-Maastricht world, we include a number of variables that tap the effect of utilitarian 
self-interest and national economic performance in our analysis. At the individual level, we 
consider levels of income and levels of education by including dummy variables for higher 
(Higher Income) and lower (Lower Income) levels of income and for higher (Higher Edu-
                                                 
9   In the model presented here, we operationalize RWPP using a dummy variable indicating if a country 
has a right-wing populist party (1= yes, 0 = no). Note, however, that analyses using percentage vote 
obtained in national parliamentary election and percentage seats in parliament to weight RWPP yielded 
similar results. 
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cation) and lower (Lower Education) levels of education. Here, we assume that those with 
higher levels of income and education are more likely to directly benefit from the eco-
nomic gains of integration and should therefore exhibit greater levels of support for the 
EU. At the country level, we utilize a global measure of economic well-being by including 
gross national product (GDP) as a measure of macroeconomic performance. Our expecta-
tion is that as GDP increases, support for the EU should increase.10
To test Anderson’s domestic politics argument at the individual level, we include a vari-
able tapping citizens’ satisfaction with national democracy (Satisfaction National Democ-
racy). Anderson’s findings suggest that “citizens who are more supportive of the way 
political institutions work at home are more likely to support European institutions and 
their country’s participation in them” (1998: 14). Thus, we anticipate satisfaction with 
national democracy to have a positive effect on support for European integration. 
We incorporate three additional country-level variables. First, we take into account a 
country’s tenure in the EU, i.e., the number of years a country has been an EU member 
state (Tenure). Our expectation is that support for European integration will be stronger in 
older EU member states than in new member states. The EU accession process is largely 
elite-driven. Accordingly, it is not uncommon to find that citizens in countries that have 
recently acceded to the EU exhibit negative attitudes towards European integration, but 
that as time passes their attitudes grow more favorable (see also Steenbergen and Jones 
2002). 
Second, we include a dummy variable indicating whether a country has had a referen-
dum on European integration (Referendum). The 1990s have seen increasing reliance on 
referenda on EU issues. Although not explicitly required by their constitutions, all four 
candidates for the 1995 enlargement held referenda, and treaty amendments have been 
subject to referenda in several member states. National referenda on EU issues inflame 
conflict on European integration, because contestation is taken out of the hands of parties 
and delivered to citizens who cast votes not for a particular party, but for (or often against) 
a particular issue. Arguably the greatest divide on European integration is the gap between 
generally pro-European elites and a more skeptical public (Hooghe 2003). Referenda pro-
vide an excellent opportunity for anti-European political entrepreneurs to exploit this gap. 
Thus, mobilized public opposition is likely to strengthen the hands of Euroskeptics. We 
therefore expect the presence of a national referendum on an EU issue will have a negative 
effect on support for European integration.  
Third, we incorporate a dummy variable for membership in the European Monetary 
Union (EMU). The EMU was launched in the Maastricht Treaty and carries tremendous 
                                                 
10  As a test for robustness, we also ran the model with two measures of economic hardship—unemploy-
ment and inflation—and found similar results. 
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symbolic significance as it entailed the provision that in 2002 the national currencies 
would be replaced by one common currency. The convergence criteria, which set the con-
ditions for the transition to the Euro and after, have become highly contested, as they 
mainly focus on budgetary restraint and in turn can be seen to strain redistributive provi-
sions. However, European and national elites tend to highlight the positive contribution of 
the EMU (and more recently the Euro) to trade and economic growth within the EMU area 
(Eichenberg and Dalton 2003: 15ff.). Overall, we expect membership in the EMU to have 
a positive effect on support for European integration. 
In addition to the substantive variables discussed above, we include two demographic 
control variables at the individual level. Work on EU support has highlighted the existence 
of a gender gap in political attitudes on European integration (Liebert 1997; Nelson and 
Guth 2000); thus, we include the dummy variable Female. Since the distribution of income 
and identity may have generational trends, we also include a variable to capture age (Age).  
Table 3 summarizes the indicators used to operationalize the dependent and independent 
variables employed in the empirical analysis. The source for the data for the dependent 
variable and individual-level independent variables is the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend 
File, 1970-2002. Due to the fact that the identity question is only incorporated in the Euro-
barometer trend file since 1992, we use 1992-2002 as the period of analysis.  
Empirical Analysis 
In order to evaluate the relevant theoretical factors influencing EU support, we incorporate 
the predictors described in the previous section in a multi-level model. This method is par-
ticularly useful given that we are interested in examining variation both at the individual 
and the country level. Particular country characteristics, namely the presence or absence of 
right-wing populist parties, provide important political contexts that interact with individ-
ual attributes, namely exclusive national identity, to produce certain political effects. To 
explain variation among citizens, we must account for variation across national contexts. 
Using a multi-level approach allows us to examine how the economic and political con-
texts shape individual differentiation in EU support. 
We use a two-level hierarchical linear model (HLM) that combines both individual-level 
measures from the Eurobarometer trend file and country-level indicators. The data we use 
to test hypotheses about the relationship between context, identity, and EU support are 
necessarily hierarchical, consisting of multiple units of data that are nested. The contextual 
unit in our analysis is the country. Because the Eurobarometer data are collected across the 
EU member states, individuals are nested within each country. Steenbergen and Jones 
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able 3: Variable Description 
ariables Description 
ependent Variable  
upport for European integration Respondent’s support for European integration as measured by the
following item: “Generally speaking, do you think [your country’s]
membership of the European Union is (1) a bad thing, (2) neither
good nor bad, (3) a good thing)?” Source: Mannheim Eurobaro-
meter Trend File. 
ndependent Variables (Individual Level ) 
xclusive National Identity Respondent’s feeling of national identity as measured by the 
following item: “In the near future, do you see yourself as (1) 
[nationality] only, (2) [nationality] and European, (3) European
and [nationality], or (4) European only?” Exclusive national identity 
is coded as (1 = 1) (2, 3, 4 = 0). Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer 
Trend File. 
nclusive National Identity Respondent’s feeling of national identity as measured by the
following item: “In the near future, do you see yourself as (1) 
[nationality] only, (2) [nationality] and European, (3) European 
and [nationality], or (4) European only?” Inclusive national identity 
is coded as (2, 3, 4 = 1) (1 = 0). Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer 
Trend File. 
atisfaction with National Democracy Respondents’ satisfaction with national democracy as measured by 
the following item: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly
satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way
democracy works in (your country)?” Source: Mannheim Euro-
barometer Trend File. 
ower Income A dummy variable indicating that a respondent falls in the bottom
quartile of the income distribution. Source: Mannheim Eurobaro-
meter Trend File. 
igher Income A dummy variable indicating that a respondent falls in the top
quartile of the income distribution. Source: Mannheim Eurobaro-
meter Trend File. 
ower Level Education A dummy variable indicating that a respondent has had up to 15
years of education. Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File.
igher Level Education A dummy variable indicating that a respondent has had 22+ years 
of education. Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File. 
emale Respondent’s gender (1 = female, 0 = male). Source: Mannheim 
Eurobarometer Trend File. 
ge Respondent’s age (in years). Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer 
Trend File. 
ndependent Variables (Contextual Level) 
DP The percentarge change in GDP in a given year. Source: OECD 
Employment Outlook 
eferendum A dummy variable indicating if a country has held a referendum
on European integration (1 = yes, 0 = no). 
enure The number of years a country has been an EU member state. This
variable was centered around the mean. 
MU A dummy variable indicating if a country is a member of the
eurozone (1 = yes, 0 = no). 
ight-wing Populist Party Dummy variable indicating if a country has a right-wing populist  
party (1 = yes, 0 = no). Here, we only consider parties that 1) 
received at least 1.5 percent of the vote in a parliamentary election 
between 1992 and 2002 or 2) obtained at least one parliamentary 
seat between 1992 and 2002. 
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(2002: 219-220) suggest that using a technique for modeling multi-level data of this type 
allows for a single model that incorporates the different levels of data without assuming a 
single level of analysis. This facilitates the exploration of causal heterogeneity and pro-
vides a test for the generalizability of findings across different contexts. Additionally, our 
data are collected at the individual level but the individuals reside within a country and are 
more likely to share common characteristics with citizens in the same country than citizens 
of another country. Because the clustering of the data is a particular statistical problem, we 
must use a method to estimate models with multilevel data that takes into account the asso-
ciated problems with standard errors.11
We begin our analysis of EU support by defining a level 1 (individual-level) model. This 
model is represented by equation 1. The dependent variable EUsupportij denotes the level 
of EU support for each respondent (i) in country (j).12 In addition to the nine individual-
level predictors, the model includes an individual-level constant β0j, which enables us to 
bring in our level 2 (country-level) predictors.  
(1) EUsupportij = β0j + β1j ExclusiveNationalIdentityij +  
β2jInclusiveNationalIdentityij + β3jSatisfactionNationalDemocracyij + 
β4jLowerIncomeij + β5jHigherIncomeij + β6jLowerIncomeij +  
β7jHigherIncomeij + β8jFemaleij + β9jAgeij + rij 
For each level 2 case (in our analysis a country), a unique level 1 model is estimated. This 
produces intercept and slope estimates specific to each country-year. At the second level, 
each of the level 1 coefficients (and their intercepts) could become a potential dependent 
variable (for a more detailed discussion see Byrk and Raudenbush 1992). The level 2 
model is represented by equation 2 and includes our five country-level predictors.  
(2) β0j = γ00 + γ01GDPj + γ02Tenurej + γ03Referendumj + γ04EMUj +  
γ05 RWPPj + δ0j 
                                                 
11 More specifically, as contextual measures are constant for individual cases residing within a given coun-
try, using standard modeling techniques, such as logistic regression, violates the assumption of inde-
pendent observations. The result is that estimates of standard errors are reduced which increases the 
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis. HLM avoids this by estimating distinct models at each level 
and by estimating unique level 1 models for each level 2 unit (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992). For our 
purposes, we estimate distinct individual level models that test the influences of national identity and 
other variables on EU support for each country. Next, we estimate a second level model that uses the 
country-level contextual measures to account for variation in the effects of the individual variables. In 
effect, this allows each country to have unique intercepts (average EU support), slopes (effects of indi-
vidual characteristics, such as national identity, on EU support), and error terms. At the second level, 
contextual effects are estimated by modeling the slopes for the influence national identity on EU support 
(i.e. the level 1 slope estimates are treated as dependent variables). 
12  Here, we measure support for European integration using the standard Eurobarometer “membership” 
question described at the outset of the article. To ensure that our findings are robust, we also ran the 
analysis using the Eurobarometer “speed” question and obtained similar results. 
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Substituting equation 2 into equation 1 enables us to summarize our multi-level model in a 
single equation.  
(3) EUsupportij = γ00 + γ01GDPj + γ02Tenurej + γ03Referendumj + γ04EMUj +  
γ05 RWPPj + γ10 ExclusiveNationalIdentityij + γ20 InclusiveNationalIdentityij +  
γ30 SatisfactionNatDemocracyij + γ40 LowerIncomeij + γ50 HigherIncomeij +  
γ60 LowerEducationij + γ70 HigherEducation + ij γ80Femaleij + γ90Ageij + δ0j + rij
The model specified in equation 3 is useful in that it brings together the predictors from the 
two levels. Moreover, since it does not assume that the predictors account for all of the 
variation in EU support at the two levels, the model yields variance components for δ0j and 
rij. This allows us to consider how to account for EU support at different levels of analysis.  
The model described thus far assumes that the level 1 predictors have fixed effects. 
Recall, however, that one of our central hypotheses (H2) suggests heterogeneity in the 
effect of one of our level 1 predictors, namely exclusive national identity. We hypothesize 
right-wing populist parties to have a decisive role in mobilizing exclusive national identity 
against European integration. Such parties draw upon nationalism to reject further control 
from Brussels thereby providing citizens with negative cues regarding European integra-
tion. For the sake of comparison, we also consider the cueing effects of right-wing populist 
parties on individuals with inclusive national identity (i.e., those who view themselves as 
both national and European). To model these interaction effects, we must relax the 
assumption that exclusive national identity and inclusive national identity, given by β1j and 
β2j respectively in equation 1, are fixed and instead stipulate that the effects vary as a func-
tion of right-wing populist parties. In other words, we model this effect as: 
(4) β1j = γ10 + γ15 RWPPj + δ0j 
(5) β2j = γ20 + γ25 RWPPj + δ0j 
Our final model is specified in equation 6 and includes the cross-level interactions:  
RWPPj * ExclusiveNationalIdentityij and RWPPj * InclusiveNationalIdentityij.  
This allows us to evaluate our second hypothesis, namely whether exclusive national 
identity interacts with the presence of a right-wing populist party to negatively impact to 
support for European integration. 
(6) EUsupportij = γ00 + γ01GDPj + γ02Tenurej + γ03Referednumj + γ04EMUj +  
γ05 RWPPj + γ10 ExclusiveNationalIdentityij + γ20 InclusiveNationalIdentityij +  
γ30 SatisfactionNatDemocracyij + γ40LowerIncomeij + γ50HigherIncomeij + 
γ60LowerEducationij + γ70HigherEducationij γ80Femaleij + γ90Ageij +  
γ15 RWPPj * ExclusiveNationalIdentityij + γ25 RWPPj * InclusiveNationalIdentityij +  
δ0j + δ1j ExclusiveNationalIdentityij + δ2j InclusiveNationalIdentityij + rij
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We begin our empirical analysis by first ascertaining if there is significant variation in EU 
support at the individual and country levels. To do so, we conduct an analysis of variance 
on our indicator for EU support. The maximum likelihood estimates of the overall mean 
and variance components are provided in table 4.13 The results from this base model 
suggest that the multi-level character of the data should not be ignored. Both of the 
variance components are significant, providing evidence of considerable variance in EU 
support at both the individual and the country levels. To obtain a better understanding of 
the relative importance of the various levels of analysis, we also consider the ratio of each 
variance component to the total variance of support for EU membership. We find that 90.8 
percent of the variance is explained at the individual level [(0.485 / 0.485 + 0.049) * 100], 
while only 9.2 percent is explained at the country level [(0.049 / 0.485 + 0.049) * 100]. 
Given that the data is measured at the individual level, this is not surprising.  
 
Table 4: Multi-level Data Variance Components 
Parameters Estimates 
Fixed Effects  
Constant 1.558* 
 (0.011) 
Variance Components  
Country-level 0.049* 
 (0.004) 
Individual Level 0.485* 
 (0.001) 
−2 x Log Likelihood 1487027.000 
Note: Table entries are maximum likelihood (IGLS) estimates with estimated standard errors are in 
parentheses; * = p < .05, one-tailed 
 
Having established that there is in fact significant variation in EU support at both the 
individual and country levels of analysis, we can consider whether the model specified in 
the previous section can account for this variance. The maximum likelihood estimates of 
the fixed effects and the variance components of the multi-level model are provided in 
table 5. Comparing these results to those provided in table 4, we find that our model is a 
significant improvement over the base model: χ2 = 117859, df = 14, p < .01. This indicates 
that at least some of the predictors included in our model have effects that are significantly 
different from zero. How powerful are our individual-level and country-level predictors in 
explaining support for European integration? We evaluate this by calculating the relative 
change in the variance components from our base model in table 4 to our fully specified 
                                                 
13  All estimates included in this paper were obtained using MLwiN V1.1. 
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model in table 5 (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992). Taken as a whole, our individual-level 
predictors perform reasonably well, as the individual-level variance components explain 
15.6 percent of the individual variance in support for the EU [(0.485 − 0.409) / 0.485 * 100]. 
With regard to the country-level, we find that our predictors perform even better. As a set, 
the country-level variance components account for 44.9 percent of the cross-national 
variance in EU support [(0.049 − 0.027) / 0.049 * 100]. 
Turning to the individual parameter estimates, we find strong support for our two main 
hypotheses. Recall that our first hypothesis suggested that both exclusive national identity 
and the presence of a right-wing populist party should be negatively related to support for 
European integration. A quick glance at our results suggests that this is indeed the case for 
exclusive national identity; exclusive national identity has a significant negative impact on 
EU support (−0.189). Note that the coefficient for inclusive national identity is both 
positive and significant, suggesting that citizens who have multiple identities (i.e., view 
themselves as both national and European) are more supportive of European integration. 
Regarding our second hypothesis—that there is an interaction effect between exclusive 
national identity and the presence of a right-wing populist party, which is negatively 
related to support for European integration—we find strong support. The interaction 
between exclusive national identity and the presence of a right-wing populist party is 
significant and is in the anticipated negative direction (−0.295). While the interaction 
between exclusive national identity and a right-wing populist party is significant, the 
presence of such a party by itself does not exert a significant influence on EU support. 
Our results also demonstrate the lasting importance of utilitarian self-interest and 
macroeconomic explanations of EU support. In contrast to Eichenberg and Dalton’s (2003) 
recent work, we find continued support for macroeconomic performance explanations of 
EU support. Increases in GDP have a positive and significant effect on support for 
European integration (0.023). Similarly, at the micro-level we find that lower levels of 
income and education have a significant negative effect on EU support, while higher levels 
have a positive effect. Thus, it appears that individuals who reap the benefits of increased 
openness associated with European integration are more likely to support the process. 
At the individual level, we also find strong evidence for the domestic politics 
explanation of support for European integration. The coefficient for satisfaction with 
national democracy is positive and significant (0.172). This bolsters Anderson’s assertion 
that citizens who are satisfied with the democratic performance of their national 
institutions are more likely to display trust vis-à-vis political institutions in general and are 
consequently more likely to support the EU (Anderson 1998: 572). Neither of our 
individual-level demographic control variables—female nor age—reached levels of 
statistical significance. 
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Table 5: Determinants of EU Support 
Parameters Estimates 
Fixed Effects  
Constant 1.179* 
 (0.049) 
Exclusive National Identity −0.189* 
 (0.035) 
Inclusive National Identity 0.076* 
 (0.029) 
Satisfaction with National Democracy 0.172* 
 (0.003) 
Lower Level Income −0.041* 
 (0.006) 
Higher Level Income 0.040* 
 (0.006) 
Lower Education −0.038* 
 (0.007) 
Higher Education 0.085* 
 (0.006) 
Female −0.038* 
 (0.005) 
Age 0.000 
 (0.000) 
GDP 0.023* 
 (0.004) 
Referendum −0.077* 
 (0.021) 
EMU 0.042* 
 (0.028) 
Tenure 0.006* 
 (0.001) 
Rightwing Populist Party −0.009 
 (0.045) 
Exclusive National Identity * Rightwing Populist Party −0.295* 
 (0.041) 
Inclusive National Identity * Rightwing Populist Party −0.117* 
 (0.033) 
Variance Components  
Country-level 0.027* 
 (0.001) 
Individual Level 0.409* 
 (0.002) 
−2 x Log Likelihood 1369168.000 
Note: Table entries are maximum likelihood (IGLS) estimates with estimated standard errors are in 
parentheses; * = p < .05, one-tailed 
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The three remaining contextual variables are signed in the predicted direction and are 
statistically significant. Though the effect is small, the length of time a country has been in 
the EU has a positive influence on citizens’ support for European integration (0.006). 
Similarly, individuals residing within the euro zone are more likely demonstrate support 
for the EU (0.042). Finally, our results indicate that the occurrence of a national 
referendum on an EU issue has a statistically significant negative influence on EU support 
(−0.077). This finding lends credence to the notion that referenda are increasingly 
becoming an outlet for Euroskepticism. 
Conclusion 
Over the past decade, the process of European integration has become contested. As the 
EU increasingly becomes a more political project, the criteria for evaluating the 
supranational organization focus more on symbolic political considerations, such as the 
feeling that the EU poses a possible threat to national identity. These uncertainties about 
the future of European integration are politicized by Euroskeptical elites. Using a multi-
level analysis and combining both individual-level Eurobarometer data and contextual 
indicators, we have examined the relevance of national identity and the presence of right-
wing populist parties in explaining levels of public support for European integration since 
the Treaty of Maastricht. The analysis presented in this article supports the notion that 
feelings of exclusive national identity, i.e., respondents that identify themselves with their 
nation-states rather than with the EU, are a major factor in explaining levels of support for 
European integration. Exclusive national identity is negatively related to EU support. 
Moreover, we have demonstrated that Euroskeptical populist right-wing parties play a 
decisive role in cueing these feelings of national identity against European integration, as 
they meld opposition to supranational governance with defense of the national community. 
Next to the impact of national identity considerations and the cueing effects of populist 
right-wing parties, the empirical analysis also highlights the lasting importance of 
economic considerations, both at the individual and national levels. We find that 
individuals with higher education and income view European integration more favorably 
than those with lower education and income. Moreover, we find that increases in GDP 
have positive effects on levels of support for European integration, indicating that when 
national economies perform, support for European integration is secured.  
Whereas previous studies have highlighted the dominance of macroeconomic perform-
ance in explaining public support for European integration, this article demonstrates the 
importance of incorporating national identity considerations into an explanation of trends 
 21 
in support for European integration. The empirical analysis indicates that national identity 
has become a relevant factor in explaining EU support in the 1990s. With the shift in the 
nature of the integration process from mainly economic to deeper political cooperation, 
national identity has become an essential factor in predicting levels in EU support and 
hence should be included in analyses attempting to explain support for European integra-
tion in the future. Methodologically, our investigation follows recent work by Steenbergen 
and Jones (2002), Brinegar and Jolly (2005), and Hooghe and Marks (forthcoming) in 
highlighting the utility of employing hierarchical models to more fully explain public sup-
port for European integration.  
This article has taken a first step toward understanding the cueing effects of political 
parties in mobilizing feelings of national identity against European integration. Next to the 
right-wing populist parties examined here, one could also imagine a role for conservative 
parties in this respect. While to a lesser extent than populist right-wing parties, many 
conservative parties also defend national culture, identity, and sovereignty against influxes 
of immigrants or external pressures from international organizations (Hooghe, Marks, and 
Wilson 2004: 136). As a result, some conservative parties have witnessed the development 
of Euroskeptical factions that may not oppose European integration as such, but argue for a 
looser Union under a more intergovernmental rubric. It will be the task of future research 
to determine the extent and significance of conservative parties in utilizing Euroskepticism. 
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